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CHAPTER 22 
Evidence 
WALTER H. MC LAUGHLIN, JR. 
§22.1. Exclusion of evidence because of illegal search and seizure. 
The constitutional provision that evidence obtained as a result of an 
illegal search and seizure is inadmissible in evidence l was applied by 
the Supreme Judicial Court during the 1964 SURVEY year less rigidly 
than in the past. In Commonwealth v. LaBossiere2 the Court affirmed 
the defendant's burglary conviction where the principal evidence 
against him was recovered from a car he was in after it had been 
stopped for a motor vehicle violation. The officer discovered the 
stolen goods by looking inside the car with the aid of a flashlight, but 
he did not enter the car at that time. The Court distinguished this 
police conduct, which it declared was not a search, from that in 
Commonwealth v. McCleery,8 where the officer actually entered the 
car after he discovered the evidence. By making trespass a necessary 
element of a search in the constitutional sense, the Court has remov.ed 
from Fourth Amendment prohibition many kinds of police action 
involving prying into an individual's affairs which could possibly be 
as repugnant to our sense of privacy as acts which do involve physical 
trespass. However, this decision does provide a standard which can 
be readily administered in the lower courts and does allow the intro-
duction of more evidence than would be admissible under a broader 
definition of search. 
In the LaBossiere case the Court condemned the practice of sub-
mitting to the jury any issue concerning the admissibility of evidence 
which allegedly resulted from an illegal search and seizure. However, 
since the judge had already ruled on the same issue by denying a 
motion to suppress, it appeared that he thought the evidence ad-
missible, and any error was therefore harmless. Since the defense 
counsel had failed to object to the submission of this issue to the jury, 
the Court refused to reverse as a result of the error. 
Commonwealth v. Palladino4 seems to liberalize the previously rigid 
application of the rule excluding the fruits of an illegal arrest. The 
WALTER H. McLAUGHLIN, JR. is a member of the firm of McLaughlin Brothers, 
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§22.1. 1 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 Sup. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). 
21964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 685, 198 N.E.2d 405. 
3345 Mass. 151, 186 N.E.2d 469 (1962), noted in 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§§1O.2, 21.1. 
4346 Mass. 720, 195 N.E.2d 769 (1964), noted in §12.2 supra. 
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defendant, who was convicted on a larceny indictment, argued that 
the statements he had made to the police after his arrest were in-
admissible, as fruits of an illegal arrest, since he had been arrested in 
Somerville by a Winchester police officer who did not have probable 
cause to believe he had committed a felony. The Court held that, 
even assuming the arrest was illegal, statements made one hour later at 
the police station were admissible because they were not "come at by 
exploitation" but "by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged 
of the primary taint." This standard, which follows that laid down by 
the United States Supreme Court, allows the admission of evidence 
which would be inadmissible under the strict "but for" principle of 
causation which the Court seemed to follow in earlier cases.5 
Commonwealth v. Lehan6 also reflected this trend away from the rigid 
application of Mapp both in dealing with the validity of a statute 
permitting a threshold inquiry and detention without arrest by a 
police officer and also in application of the fruits doctrine. Late 
one night when two police officers, one of whom had previously known 
the defendant, spotted him walking down the street carrying two large 
boxes, they stopped him to inquire about the contents of the boxes 
and the purpose of the trip. He explained that he was leaving his 
wife, moving to a room, and taking a hairdryer, silverware, and 
presents with him. Suspicious, the officers at this point verified the 
contents of the cartons and then requested the defendant to accompany 
them to his home to verify the story. When Mrs. Lehan failed to 
corroborate, they arrested Lehan, searched him, and later verified that 
the articles in his possession were stolen. . The Court, threading its 
way through contrary federal precedents like a broken field runner, 
upheld the constitutionality of a statute permitting police officers to 
make an initial inquiry into the activities of people abroad in the 
night without making an arrest. 
To reach this result the Court distinguished Henry v. United States,7 
which seemed to hold that officers could not stop an automobile on 
suspicion unless they had probable cause to believe the occupants had 
committed a crime, by observing that in the Henry case the govern-
ment had unnecessarily conceded that an arrest had been made at the 
time of the initial detention. Moreover, later federal cases failed to 
construe Henry as holding that all threshold detentions and inquiries 
are forbidden. The Supreme Judicial Court also relied upon Ker v. 
California,8 which distinguished between rules that are applicable 
only to the federal courts and rules having a constitutional basis which 
5 Compare Commonwealth v. Spofford, 8411 Mass. 7011, 708, 180 N.E.2d 6711, 677 
(1962), where the Court, in excluding evidence under the fruits doctrine, said that 
a police station was "no environment to make a free choice even where the record 
is barren of evidence of threats, duress, coercion or promises made by the police 
officers." 
61964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 455, 196 N.E.2d 840, noted in §§11.2, 12.2 supra. 
71161 U.S. 98, 80 Sup. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1114 (1959). 
81174 U.S. 23, 83 Sup. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963). 
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are thus also applicable to the state courts. Ker also permitted the 
states to adopt "workable rules which meet the practical demands of 
effective criminal investigation and law enforcement." Finally, the 
Court was influenced by the fact that if a threshold inquiry were un-
constitutional, many defendants, whose rights of privacy had been 
invaded in only the slightest degree, would be able to escape 
conviction. 
Once the Court found the threshold inquiry valid under the cir-
cumstances of this case, it proceeded to find that the search of the 
defendant's cartons at the time of the initial detention, prior to his 
arrest, was invalid, being neither incidental to an arrest in search for 
weapons, nor pursuant to a valid warrant, and reversed the conviction 
upon this ground. However, again applying the fruits doctrine in a 
restrictive manner, the Court looked at all the legitimately acquired 
evidence and concluded that it was sufficient to justify an arrest, even 
though the officers in making the arrest may have, in fact, been relying 
upon the illegally obtained evidence to a large extent. Again, the 
Court seemed to require convincing proof that further evidence had 
been obtained by exploitation of the original search before applying 
the fruits doctrine. 
The importance of a search warrant is vividly illustrated by two cases 
in which the state police made arrests for illegal bookmaking. In 
Commonwealth v. Mekalian9 officers caught the defendant in the act, 
arrested him, seized the racing sheets, and, upon searching him, found 
$105, which the defendant admitted was the profits from the illegal 
activity. The Supreme Court allowed a motion to suppress all the 
evidence seized; the arrest was illegal even though the offense had been 
committed in the officers' presence, since it was only a misdemeanor 
and not a breach of the peace. 
On the other hand, in Commonwealth v. McDermottlO the police 
moved more slowly. For two days Trooper Neilsen kept a lunchroom 
under surveillance and observed bookie operations carried on by the 
defendant. He and a fellow officer then obtained a search and arrest 
warrant, commonly called a bookie warrant. Neilsen then proceeded 
to the premises, observed further bookie operations, and pointed out 
the defendant to the officer making the arrest, who had made none of 
the observations necessary to obtain the warrant or make the arrest. 
The Court, however, held that since the knowledge of one officer in 
a cooperative effort was the knowledge of all, the arrests and con-
victions were valid. 
In summary, the general attitude shown by the Supreme Judicial 
Court in the area of unreasonable search and seizure has brought about 
an effective accommodation between the int.erests of individual privacy 
and effective law enforcement. The limitation of the application of 
the fruits doctrine to only those cases in which there was exploitation 
9346 Mass. 496,194 N.E.2d 390 (1963),.noted in §11.2 supra. 
101964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 519, 197 N.E.2d 668, noted in §11.2 supra. 
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of illegally seized evidence, the validation of the right of the police to 
make threshold inquiries, and increasing sophistication on the part 
of the police have contributed to this accommodation. Technicalities 
in the law, particularly those concerning the right to arrest and searches 
made incident to arrest, will continue to provide substantial litigation 
in this field for many years to come. 
§22.2. Right to counsel: Admissions. In 1964 the United States 
Supreme Court, in the cases of Massiah v. United States1 and Escobedo 
v. Illinois,2 extended ,the constitutional protection of the right to 
counsel by holding that unless that right. had been specifically waived, 
after defendant had been advised of it, statements made in the absence 
of counsel were inadmissible in evidence if made after the investigation 
had shifted from the investigatory phase to the accusatory phase. The 
Supreme Judicial Court first applied this doctrine in Commonwealth 
v. McCarthy.8 Many of the difficult problems raised by the United 
States Supreme Court concerning the point at which the right to 
counsel exists were not present here, because the statement made to 
the police in the absence of counsel, which had been retained for de-
fendant by his mother, was made after he had been indicted. 
In reversing the conviction and ordering a new trial, the Court 
was not concerned that there was other evidence from which the 
jury might have convicted the defendant because it found "a reason-
able possibility that the confession might have contributed" to it. The 
doctrine of harmless error was not applicable. 
The Escobedo and Massiah cases have wrought changes in the law of 
criminal evidence as profound as those brought about by the Mapp 
case in 1960, but the precise scope of the rules of those cases and their 
effects upon state law must be made clear by the United States Su-
preme Court in future cases. In the meantime, the courts of the 
Commonwealth will have the difficult task of applying their broad 
principles to a wide variety of statements made by the defendant and 
of reaching results that are both fair to the accused and productive of 
orderly administration of justice. 
§22.3. Legislation. The legislature in 1964 updated the statute1 
requiring parties to personal injury cases to furnish the adverse parties 
with a copy of any statement signed by them within ten days or lose 
the use of it in court proceedings. Recognizing the widespread use 
of recording devices by investigators who customarily obtain such 
statements, the legislature required the party recording such a state-
ment to furnish a verbatim written transcription within ten days of 
demand or lose the right to use the statement in a courtroom.2 Thus, 
the legislature took another small step forward toward requiring ade-
§22.2. 1 'tJ77 U.S. 201, 84 Sup. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1964). 
2 'tJ78 U.S. 478, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964). 
81964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1I'tJ'tJ, 200 N.E.2d 264, noted in §1l.'tJ supra. 
§22.'tJ. 1 C.L., c. 2'tJ'tJ, §2'!JA. 
2 Acts of 1964, c. 5'tJ7. 
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quate pretrial discovery. The oral discovery bill, which would have 
opened the door wide, was, however, resoundingly defeated. 
§22.4. Land damage evidence. The substantial number of land 
damage cases tried in the Commonwealth in 1964 produced two 
significant opinions pertaining to the law of evidence. 
Consolini v. Commonwealth,l concerning the taking of a gravel bed, 
for the most part emphasized the discretion vested in the trial judge on 
questions of relevancy but also showed how that discretion can be 
abused. The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the trial judge in ex-
cluding evidence of a royalty agreement in effect at the time of the 
taking, even though such an agreement is analogous to a lease and is 
likely to be indicative of the amount of return the owner was receiv-
ing for his land. The trial judge'S exclusion of the value of the gravel 
in place was likewise upheld, despite the fact that this was evidence 
of one of the principal elements making up the value of the land and 
that, presented in this form, it would not tend to confuse a jury the 
way evidence of the fair market value of the severed mineral would. 
The trial judge allowed an expert to testify for the Commonwealth, 
although the expert, who had an extensive real estate background, 
had appraised only one other gravel bed. Again, the Court held that 
the qualification of an expert was within the sound discretion of the 
trial judge. 
Discretion has its limits, however. The trial judge refused to admit 
evidence of two practically contemporaneous sales of contiguous 
parcels of land also operated as gravel pits, on the ground that while 
the parcel taken constituted eleven acres, the two sales offered were of 
parcels of one-fifth of an acre and forty acres. The Supreme Court 
held that the judge had committed reversible error and granted 
the petitioner a new trial. 
Proof of the value of mineral-bearing land can sometimes be ex-
tremely difficult. In this case, the trial court, in its discretion, ex-
cluded much evidence that might have been helpful. One of the best 
indicia of value is the selling price of similar land. It would seem that 
the Supreme Judicial Court properly held that the trial judge had 
abused his discretion in refusing to admit evidence of the sales of 
contiguous parcels. 
Valley Paper Co. v. Holyoke Housing Authority2 presented another 
unusual eminent domain case. The taking authority took from the 
Valley Paper Company a parcel of land which was separated by a 
canal from the land on which its main plant stood. The company had 
a right to bridge the canal. The petitioner attempted to prove 
damages by showing that the land taken had unique values as a possi-
ble area for expansion so that its loss resulted in consequential damage 
to the factory, which was not taken. The Supreme Judicial Court 
held that under certain circumstances the taking of a parcel of land 
§22.4. 1346 Mass. 501, 194 N.E.2d 407 (1963), also noted in §14.26 supra. 
2346 Mass. 561, 194 N.E.2d 700 (1963), also noted in §§14.25, 14.26 supra. 
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which is, or potentially will be, used jointly with a noncontiguous 
parcel does require the Court to consider the severance damage to 
the noncontiguous parcel and went on to say that this was possibly 
such a case. However, the Court upheld the trial judge's exclusion 
of evidence of damage to the parcel not taken on the ground that no 
proper basis had been laid for treating the two parcels as a unit; the 
offer of proof did not include evidence of possible expansion onto the 
land taken in the foreseeable future. On this narrow ground the 
trial judge's ruling was sustained, emphasizing again the necessity of 
laying a proper foundation for evidence if it is desired to appeal its 
exclusion. 
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